Moving forward with coherence: the reinstatement of the customs broker as a symbol of maturity in Brazilian customs policy

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1.Introduction: the institutional challenge under debate

The exclusion of customs brokers from the Brazilian Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) Program, consolidated by Normative Instruction RFB No. 1.834/2020, represents not only an administrative inconsistency but also a disconnect from the principles that govern modern customs. This category, historically linked to the legal and operational structure of Brazilian foreign trade, was removed from a program that, by essence, should value compliance, predictability, and public-private partnerships.

This article proposes an institutional reflection on the reasons why the reinstatement of the customs broker to the AEO is not only a legitimate measure but also necessary. The argument is based on three fundamental axes: (i) internal legal and regulatory coherence; (ii) convergence with international customs management standards; and (iii) the legislative opportunity represented by Bill No. 15/2024.

2. The customs broker as a historical link in national customs

As demonstrated in the article “Unraveling History: Conjectures on the Origin and Transformation of Brazilian Customs Brokers since 1808” (FERREIRA; FAZOLO, 2025), the formal origin of the customs broker profession dates back to the Decree of June 7, 1809, promulgated by Prince Regent João, which instituted the office of Court Customs Broker. Since then, this position has played an essential role in tax administration, acting in the documentary legalization of shipments, in representing merchants before the tax authority, and in the conformity of foreign trade operations.

Currently, the customs broker:

• Acts directly in the formalization and transmission of import and export declarations;
• Operates the computerized systems of the Federal Revenue (SISCOMEX, Single Portal, DUIMP);
• Interprets and applies the customs and tax legislation applicable to each operation;
• Legally represents operators before the tax authority;
• Cooperates in risk mitigation and compliance with customs operations.

It is, therefore, a consolidated institutional figure, provided for by law, with its own registry, and whose responsibility is unequivocal within the framework of Decree No. 6.759/2009 (Customs Regulation), of Normative Instruction RFB No. 1.209, of November 7, 2011, of IN RFB No. 1.273, of June 6, 2012, and of ADE Coana No. 16, of June 8, 2012, with its subsequent modifications.

3. The OAS Program and the principles of modern customs

Inspired by the World Customs Organization (WCO) SAFE Framework, the AEO Program seeks to certify supply chain actors who demonstrate a track record of compliance and effective risk management. Its pillars are: voluntariness, partnership, institutional trust, simplification, and security.

The customs broker, due to his ongoing technical work and direct involvement in the information supporting customs clearance, is—by definition—part of the evaluated logistics chain. Excluding him from the group of those eligible for the AEO contradicts the program's philosophy and violates the principle of functional equivalence required by the mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) that Brazil negotiates, especially with the United States.

4. On normative exclusion and its weak foundations

Regulatory Instruction RFB No. 1.834/2020 formally excluded customs brokers from the possibility of becoming AEO certified. The Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal) stated that this was due to the increase in legal actions initiated by brokers seeking recognition of their right to join without having to pass a technical exam.

However, this justification has two weaknesses:

a) Litigation is not deviant behavior, but rather the exercise of a constitutional right. Litigation is not exclusive to the category of dispatchers, nor is it associated with institutional bad faith.

b) The exclusion was broad, general, and without the right to defense—it even affected already certified brokers with a history of compliance, who were summarily disqualified. In 2020, at least 44 professionals were excluded without prior consultation or a transition period, exacerbating regulatory uncertainty.

This is a disproportionate measure that punished an entire professional category for a legal dispute that could have been resolved through specific regulatory adjustments and institutional dialogue.

5.The technical qualification exam and its distortion

The requirement for the Technical Qualification Examination for a dispatcher to be certified as an AEO was introduced by Regulatory Instruction RFB No. 1.598/2015. However, the test organized by the ESAF proved to be an inadequate instrument for its intended purpose: its level of complexity was incompatible with professional practice, its content was excessively legal, and its overall failure rate was low.

In 2017, the Feaduaneiros (National Federation of Customs Brokers) sent Official Letter No. 012/2017 to the Federal Revenue Service, warning of the inadequacy of the model applied. The respectful and proactive document already anticipated that the combination of disproportionate scrutiny and functional exclusion could lead to avoidable legal conflicts.

In 2023, the Supreme Court of Justice (Resp. No. 1.937.791/EC) recognized the legality of the sub-legal exclusion of customs brokers from the AEO Program, as there is no acquired right to certification. However, the decision itself reaffirms that membership in the program depends on discretionary public policy and technical criteria defined by the Administration, which does not preclude regulatory review through legal or regulatory means in light of new technical, political, or institutional understandings.

6. Comparative law and the American customs broker

In the United States, the profession equivalent to customs brokerage—customs broker—is certified by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) through passing a national exam. Once certified, the professional can apply for CTPAT certification (equivalent to AEO), provided that:

• Be active and have a current license;
• Have a structure in the USA;
• Meet objective criteria for cargo security and risk management.

No reexamination or additional academic verification is required. The focus is on institutional compliance and the company's operational technical capacity, not on individual professional revalidation. The customs broker is treated as a strategic partner of customs, not as a presumed risk to the logistics chain.

The same guideline is observed in the AEO programs of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the European Union, all signatories of the WCO SAFE Framework: the customs legal representative is a certifiable part of the secure logistics chain.

In the comparative context, the Brazilian exclusion represents a regulatory exception that compromises the functional equivalence provided for in the Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and weakens the legitimacy of the national model in the face of international commitments.

7. Adherence to ARMs and risks of functional non-compliance

Brazil is currently a signatory to nine Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) with 16 foreign customs administrations, including strategic partners such as the United States, the European Union, China, Mexico, and Mercosur countries. These agreements, concluded under the World Customs Organization (WCO) SAFE Framework, aim to ensure equivalence among Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programs, fostering mutual trust, reciprocal treatment, and interoperability of certification models.
Although MRAs do not follow the traditional format of international treaties requiring legislative approval, they constitute formal international commitments between customs administrations, with regulatory backing and concrete operational effects. Their purpose is clear: to ensure that national programs reciprocally recognize the same types of actors, levels of security, and trade benefits.
The exclusion of the customs broker from the Brazilian AEO Program creates a significant regulatory asymmetry. In countries with which Brazil has signed MRAs—such as the United States (CTPAT), Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and the countries of the European Union—the figure of the customs broker, customs representative, or clearing agent, is commonly certifiable as an AEO. The lack of this provision in Brazil jeopardizes the functional balance of the agreement and could constitute a technical or operational breach of the commitments assumed.

This scenario weakens:

• The reciprocal relationship provided for in the terms and spirit of the MRAs;
• The consistency of the benefits granted to foreign certified operators with the rights guaranteed to nationals;
• And Brazil's image as a country that adheres to and implements the good customs governance practices recommended by the WCO.
  

From a legal and administrative perspective, this omission not only disregards the logic of international regulatory symmetry, but could also compromise the full effectiveness of the signed agreements, hindering reciprocal audits, the interoperability of risk profiles, and the joint validation of operators.
Therefore, the regulatory reinstatement of the customs broker to the Brazilian AEO Program is not only a legitimate measure from a domestic perspective, but also a necessity to ensure compliance with the international obligations Brazil has already assumed in terms of mutual recognition and security in the logistics chain.

8.PL No. 15/2024: an opportunity for regulatory coherence

The processing of Bill No. 15/2024, which establishes the National Tax and Customs Compliance System, represents a concrete opportunity to recognize, at the regulatory level, the technical role of the customs broker in compliance programs, including the AEO Program.

The complementary regulations are expected to establish objective criteria and promote dialogue with the category's representative entities, ensuring legal certainty, institutional coherence, and alignment with international best practices.

During the 2023 Public Consultation, the São Paulo Customs Brokers Union (SINDASP) was the only entity to present a structured proposal for the reinstatement of the category, with more than 100 technical suggestions. Despite this, Regulatory Instruction RFB No. 2.154/2023 maintained the exclusion of customs brokers from the list of stakeholders, despite them being technically responsible for the absolute majority of clearances registered in the country.

Brazil, the only signatory to nine Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) that does not include freight forwarders in its national program, is misaligned with the WCO SAFE Framework and the US CTPAT criteria, raising significant questions about the consistency of the logistics chain under state supervision.

9. To reintegrate is to strengthen: the public role of the customs broker

The reinstatement of the customs broker to the OAS Program does not represent a privilege, but rather the institutional recognition of a regulated public function with consolidated technical, fiscal, and legal responsibilities.

Experienced and duly registered professionals, who assume formal responsibility for the declarations they submit, already operate on the front lines of customs compliance. Considering them strategic partners in risk management is a measure of regulatory rationality and efficiency.

Excluding them, on the other hand, compromises the effectiveness of the AEO Program itself, weakens the logic of mutual trust, and ignores the category's historical contribution to customs governance.

It would be appropriate, at this point, to also reflect more specifically on the relevance of a possible automatic—or conditional—reinstatement to the Program of those 44 customs brokers who were previously excluded.

10. A constructive model for regulatory updating

Overcoming the current impasse requires the adoption of a certification model that:

• Evaluate the experience and regular performance of the registered professional;
• Encourage ongoing training through recognized programs;
• Be auditable, transparent and equal in relation to other stakeholders;
• Avoid judicialization by replacing qualifying exams with verifiable technical and functional criteria.

The category does not require differential treatment, but rather appropriate conditions to voluntarily contribute to the improvement of Brazilian customs, in line with the principles of the SAFE Framework.

11. Final considerations: coherence, convergence and institutional maturity

The current context demands institutional maturity. Brazilian Customs cannot do without professionals who master the legislation, operate the Revenue Department systems, and assume direct responsibility for the content of declarations.

The exclusion of customs brokers from the AEO Program was a technical and institutional error. Correcting it, with serenity and dialogue, is essential to restoring regulatory coherence and aligning Brazil with international practices of regulated trust.

Reinstating these professionals means strengthening the AEO, reinforcing the commitments made at the international level, and consolidating a more balanced and effective customs policy.

12. Epilogue: Rebuilding Trust

Brazil faces a historic opportunity. Bill No. 15/2024 provides the foundation for a modern and reliable compliance model. For this model to gain legitimacy, it is necessary to correct the regulatory deficiencies of the past.

Reincorporating the customs broker into the AEO Program is more than a technical adjustment: it is the restoration of an institutional logic based on trust, predictability, and respect for essential public functions, pillars of the integrity of international trade.

The absence of this category in the Brazilian program represents a technical deficiency, a deviation from internationally recognized models, and a weakness in the face of the commitments made by the country in bilateral and multilateral agreements.

This is not a corporate demand, but rather a restoration of administrative logic and institutional justice. Modern customs, guided by the WCO and practiced by the world's leading customs administrations, requires cooperation, recognition, and inclusion of legitimate links in the logistics chain.

As the biblical warning goes, we must not look back—or else we will petrify progress. This is a time of reconstruction. And reconstruction, in this case, means reincorporation.

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Highlighted

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